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Than Declaring Rights May be
the Most Promising Route
to the Objective
Lynton K. Caldwell
Q. Tell me in no more than thirty seconds
why an environmental amendment to
the United States Constitution is nec-
essary.
A. The drafters in 1787 did not foresee the
severe impacts that unprecedented ex-
pansion of population, technology and
economic power would have upon the
environment, and thus made no provi-
sion for its wise governance in the public
Interest. Protection of the environment
has now become an urgent responsibil-
ity to which our traditional legal system
responds inadequately. A late arrival
among the priorities of Americans, envi-
ronmental values tend to be discounted
in competition with limited, short term
economic Interests. And in the absence
of a constitutional referent, the courts
are reluctant to reverse executive deci-
sions. Where there is a constitutional
mandate, (for example, the Civil Rights'
Amendments) the courts take a closer
look; where there is none, as in envi-
ronmental cases, they reverse executive
decisions only where they find flagrant
disregard of statutory law. Thus, there is
a need to place environmental protec-
tion clearly among the powers, authori-
ties, and responsibilities conferred upon
the government of the United States un-
der the Constitution.
THE CASE IN SUMMARY
A growing number of people are con-
cluding that without a constitutional man-
date, environmental goals specified in
statutes such as the National Environmental
Policy Act1 will never be attained.2 This
conclusion follows from two observations:
the first is an apparent inclination of the
Congress to compromise principle in pursuit
of expediency. The second is the tendency
of the American judiciary to defer to the ex-
ecutive branch in the interpretation of legal
obligations in the absence of an explicit con-
stitutional requirement regarding discre-
tionary acts. Courts can more readily ascer-
tain whether procedural requirements have
been met than determine whether adminis-
trative decisions on substantive issues are
consistent with NEPA.3
Whether judicial intervention in adminis-
trative decision making is insufficient or ex-
cessive in its present form is largely a ques-
tion of legal philosophy. In civil rights cases
judicial intervention has been carried to great
lengths, in contrast to judicial deference to
administrative judgment in environmental
cases. Yet it is becoming increasingly diffi-
cult to demonstrate that person-to-person
human rights are ultimately more important
than the relationship of humans to the bio-
sphere, a relationship which decisively af-
fects human welfare, health and happiness.
I do not set forth first or fourteenth amend-
ment adjudication as a model for environ-
mental decisions, but I do argue that be-
cause of basic inconsistencies between tra-
ditional assumptions regarding property
rights and the needs and obligations of envi-
ronmental protection, the three divisions of
government need a comprehensive state-
ment of principles to guide policy making.
Some have argued that statutory law-
both federal and state-provides sufficient
environmental protection. One might as-
sume that members of state legislatures and
the United States Congress would honor
the language and spirit of prior statutory en-
actments. But this assumption fails to take
account of the ambiguous and often para-
doxical behavior of legislative bodies. On
certain questions of policy the personal, po-
litical and economic interests of members
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may be served by ignoring that certain of
their statutory provisions are not judicially en-
forceable. Members of Congress who have
cultivated personal images as environmental
defenders have reversed their positions
where powerful economic interests in their
constituencies oppose environmental legis-
lation. Timber, energy, water, mineral, agri-
cultural and mass recreation interests are
among the more notorious advocates of
freedom from environmental controls. Statu-
tory provisions authorizing multiple uses of
public lands provide for the optimal use and
management of such lands; they have also
been favored by some resource develop-
ment interests to prevent the "locking up" of
minerals and timber in environmentally pro-
tected areas. 4 Absent criteria for determin-
ing priorities, resolution of conflicting inter-
ests results in trial by political combat.
The Congress, as well as legislatures
generally, lacks self-discipline. The practice
of trade-offs for votes enables the enact-
ment of special-interest legislation that, in
principle, a majority of members might other-
wise reject. The Congress can evade or ig-
nore the substantive provisions of NEPA be-
cause, unlike civil rights or freedom of
speech issues, there is no constitutional
provision that restrains the sacrifice of envi-
ronmental values to political expediency and
self-interest.
An environmental amendment should
not substitute for law more appropriately ad-
dressed by statute. The National Environ-
mental Policy Act affords a mandate suffi-
cient, if applied, for achieving high goals of
environmental quality and sustainability. But
except for its procedural requirements-no-
tably the environmental impact statement-
NEPA is enforceable only at executive dis-
cretion. Only in flagrant instances of execu-
tive dereliction are the courts likely to inter-
vene.5 NEPA does not declare "rights;" it
does declare obligations, which implies that
the American people have a "right" to expect
the government to administer public affairs in
accordance with its declared principles.
Long experience with the dereliction of envi-
ronmental regulations by federal agencies
was a powerful motive for enacting NEPA.
The Executive branch's continuing avoid-
ance of NEPA's mandates provides an ar-
gument for its constitutional reinforcement.
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
It Is not realistic to rely upon specified le-
gal rights to protect the environment per se.
Proposals for constitutional reinforcement of
environmental laws have hitherto sought to
declare environmental rights. As early as
December 11, 1967 a constitutional amend-
ment was proposed in the House of Repre-
sentatives by Congressman Charles E.
Bennett (HJ Res 954). A similar proposal
was made on June 13,1968 by Represen-
tative Richard Ottinger (HJ Res 1321), and In
April 1970 by Representative Morris Udall(HJ Res 1205). Congress has not acted up-
on these proposed "environmental rights"
amendments. The drafters of NEPA at-
tempted to establish environmental rights by
statute. However, the provision In Senate
Bill 1075 that "each person has a fundamen-
tal and inalienable right to a healthful envi-
ronment" was deleted in conference.6
On January 19, 1970 Senators Gaylord
Nelson, Alan Cranston and Clairborne Pell
introduced SJ Res 169, an amendment
which declared that "every person has the
inalienable right to a decent environment.
The United States and every State shall
guarantee this right." However, had any of
these provisions been adopted, It is doubt-
ful that they would have achieved their pur-
pose. Defining a practicable and generally
acceptable definition of "decent" would like-
ly prove an Impossible task.
A new wave of interest In an environ-
mental amendment arose In the late 1980s
and continues to advance. After reviewing
two decades of experience with the National
Environmental Policy Act, It Is evident that a
constitutional amendment Is needed to Im-
plement fully the Act's provisions and to ex-
tend its principles to other statutory provi-
sions (notably those authorizing multiple
uses of certain public lands).7 Meanwhile
several concrete proposals for amendments
have been made. Among them Is the text of
a proposed Environmental Quality Amend-
ment, which the National Wildlife Federation
published in March 1987 and revised In
September 1989. Concerned citizens, such
as Marshall Massey and Carolyn Merchant,
have made similar proposals.8 These draf is
adopted the "rights" thesis that character-
ized the Bennett and Ottinger resolutions of
1967 and 1968. All of these proposals are
based upon an assumption that there Is, or
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ought to be, a right to a safe and sanitary
environment. Some proposals (for example,
Richard Cartwright Austin's "Civil Rights for
Nature") would extend this right to all living
species and natural systems.9
Between these proposals and mine
(which follows), there is a fundamental juris-
prudential difference. The objective of the
foregoing amendments would be the adop-
tion of an environmental bill of rights. I infer
the focus upon rights to be inspired by,
although not necessarily dependent upon, a
philosophy of natural rights derived from
natural law.' 0 (This is the philosophy em-
bodied in the Declaration of Independence,
reflecting the rationale of the Enlightment of
the eighteenth century that is still widely ac-
cepted in America today). One may, of
course, take a utilitarian view of rights-un-
derstanding rights to be socially derived, not
Inherent in the nature of things and hence
never Inalienable. However, I do not find the
"rights" approach to environmental protec-
tion the most promising route to the funda-
mental objective of environmental protec-
tion. There are great difficulties in interpret-
ing and applying a constitutional amendment
based upon rights. There are, however,
fewer difficulties, and a more enforceable
mandate, in an amendment that establishes
a governmental obligation to administer the
laws and policies in ways that avoid unnec-
essary damage to the environment, its spe-
cies and ecosystems. The principal difficulty
with the "rights" approach is that it opens the
door to potentially endless, indeterminate
litigation. It is easier to enforce clearly de-
fined obligations-even if general in charac-
ter-than to adjudicate an indefinite number
of Individual claims with indeterminate merits.
Although there is a fundamental philo-
sophical difference between laws asserting
rights and laws establishing obligations,
rights are Implicit in obligations. In a demo-
cratic society people have a "right" to have
the obligations of their government hon-
ored, or at least acknowledged, and not sub-
verted or ignored. This right is an expansion
of responsible self-government and derives
from a general social consensus.
Enforceable rights relate to human be-
havior, but humanity has no inherent rights
that are enforceable against nature. For ex-
ample, a right to a healthful environment
might be enforced against transgression by
humans (for example, cigarette smoking).
But nature could hardly be held liable for
conditions under which human behavior
leads to heat stroke, emphysema or malaria.
The purpose of a limited rights thesis in envi-
ronmental law is to protect both humans and
nature from abusive human action against
nature. Explicit law is required to define, and
where necessary, to deny claimed rights to
degrade or destroy the natural world. Nature
cannot hold society legally accountable, but
governments may be made responsible for
the preservation of nature.
A constitutional provision is most appro-
priate when it addresses the powers and re-
sponsibilities of government. The Constitu-
tion of the United States, as amended, lays
no explicit obligation upon the government
to protect and maintain the quality of the en-
vironment. Environmental legislation en-
acted by the United States Congress is
based upon implied powers, or enacted pur-
suant to enumerated powers pertaining, for
example, to interstate commerce, taxation or
treaties. The environment is a relatively new
policy focus; most environmental legislation
is barely a quarter-century old. Difficulties
are inevitable in reconciling new envi-
ronmental concepts with traditional legal as-
sumptions. Moreover, scientific discoveries
have profound effects in all areas of environ-
mental law, from clean air legislation to the
control of toxic substances. For example,
the identification of carcinogens and the
reinterpretation of the Rivers and Harbors
Act of 18991" have triggered the application
of long-standing, dormant legal provisions. It
is unrealistic to expect that comparatively
recent understandings of environmental
relationships could easily displace 300 years
of beliefs regarding property rights and legiti-
mate expectations as they affect the future
of the Earth and humanity.
It has become conventional to speak of
the "rights of nature" or the rights of other
living species against human exploitation or
abuse. 12 But the natural world cannot de-
fend those rights directly. Humans must act
on behalf of nature to restrict certain behav-
lors in relation to nature. Thus, although na-
ture has no defensible rights against human.
ity, humankind cannot be accorded unlim-
ited rights against nature if the natural world
is to be preserved. Human rights can be
established and enforced against human be-
havior, but it is not evident that rights can be
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enforced against nature. Reasonable re-
sponsibilities laid on public officials for pro-
tecting the quality of air, water, soil, ecosys-
tems, and human settlements and develop-
ments are enforceable if established by stat-
ute, and more certainly so if reinforced by
constitutional principles.
DIFFERENCES IN APPROACH
The decision to seek protection of the
environment through declared individual
rights or public responsibilities may be re-
garded as a tactical option. I therefore have
no quarrel with the amendment proposed by
the National Wildlife Federation. 13 However,
the more reliable and less convoluted route
to sustainable relationships between
humanity and nature is not through respec-
tive rights not easily defined or defended,
but through responsibilities affirmed by fun-
damental law.
Might this concept of social responsibil-
ity through government be written into law?
Following is a draft amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States that, in less
than fifty words, declares the responsibility
of government to protect the quality and in-
tegrity of the environment:
In all acts of government, the in-
tegrity and sustainability of natural
systems shall not be impaired ex-
cept to protect health and safety
where no acceptable alternative ex-
ists. Maintenance, restoration, and
renewability of natural systems, en-
hancement of environmental quality,
and fairness to posterity shall be
governing principles of policy.
The proposed amendment does not at-
tempt to encompass directly all aspects of
environmental policy, many of which are ad-
dressed more effectively through statutory
laws. The amendment could strengthen the
application of those statutes by affirming the
responsibility of government for attaining the
statutes' objectives. The phrase "all acts of
government" does not imply that the federal
government is the sole agent of responsibil-
ity. Acts of government occur at all jurisdic-
tional levels-international, national, state
and local. Acts of government affecting en-
vironmental conditions need to be consis-
tent with the environmental principles de-
clared in the Constitution. The amendment
does not confer explicit rights on posterity,
but affirms the responsibility of public policy
makers to consider the impact of their ac-
tions upon future generations.14
Thus, the proposed constitutional
amendment is not an attempt to write Into
the Constitution legal provisions appropriate
to statutes. The Constitution of the United
States was intended to establish a structure
for a federal government and to specify its
responsibilities, powers and limitations. This
amendment makes explicit those responsi-
bilities hitherto deduced by Implication from
other specified responsibilities and powers.
We have reached a point in the develop-
ment of our society at which the fragmentary
bases of our environmental legislation are
inadequate to support the actions that may
be necessary to attain national and interna-
tional environmental policy objectives. The
counterargument-that we have all of the
powers and laws needed to protect the envi-
ronment-ignores experience. For exam-
ple, authority for environmental protection
may be present, but compulsion to act may
be missing. Moreover, there are contradic-
tions and equivocations In statutory law that,
for example, allow the multiple-use mandate
of the Congress to be Invoked to defeat pro-
tective measures. In the absence of a fun-
damental constitutional declaration, we may
have more statutes and regulations than
would be needed if the environmental re-
sponsibilities of the federal government
were made explicit.
This amendment does not Impose legal
burdens or responsibilities upon the gov-
ernment beyond those already declared by
statutory law. It does diminish the possibili-
ties of their evasion, and narrows the discre-
tion of decision makers to act in conformity
with declared national policy. It opens the
way to judicial review of the substantive con-
sequences of administrative decisions. To
the extent that the Congress, the President,
and the bureaucracy act In good faith In con-
formity with the amendment, it should re-
duce rather than increase the volume of liti-
gation. By intent, the amendment appears
to move the balance in economy-environ-
ment controversies toward considerations of
environmental integrity and sustainabifty. In
fact, it would tend to shift action away from
the striking of balances between environ-
mental and economic considerations toward
a search for synthesis in which fundamental
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and continuing values were reconciled in the
general and long-term public interest. To
this end, the amendment might force a more
valid and basic definition of environmental
and economic values. All too frequently, a
close examination of asserted economic val-
ues reveals them to be little more than short-
sighted and self-serving subjective prefer-
ences. Environmental values are also sus-
ceptible to self-serving tendencies, and are
equally deserving of evaluation in the de-
termination of public policies.
Differences in viewpoint over a constitu-
tional amendment come down, at least in
part, to differences over priorities. People
with political influence and popular following
have urged constitutional amendments for
prayer in schools and against flag burning.
Are these issues more urgent and more im-
portant than the state of the natural systems
of air, water, land and biota upon which the
future of the nation depends?
Fears that an environmental amendment
would widen the door to endless litigation
are misplaced. An emphasis on "rights"
would more readily invite self-serving abuse
of the legal system than would fixing re-
sponsibility for the environment upon gov-
ernment. It would be less subject to corrup-
tion by the victimization-compensation ob-
session that now distorts the entire justice
system. The litigious character of American
public life today is a consequence of unpre-
dictability, politicization of the justice system,
and an excessive emphasis on contempo-
rary personal rights to the neglect of social
responsibilities. It has less to do with the ac-
tual merits of substantive law or its rational in-
terpretation. The implication of most objec-
tions to an environmental amendment is that
people-to-people issues are far more impor-
tant than people-to-environment issues. We
are slow to comprehend that the impact of
people upon the environment is also an im-
pact upon people-now and in the future.
Environmental issues are people-to-people
and transgenerational issues.
Our lack of constitutional protection of
the environmental basis of our health, secu-
rity and prosperity contrasts sharply with our
commitment to civil rights. The fifth and four-
teenth amendments are motivated by con-
siderations of justice; judicial interpretations
of these amendments and of the require-
ments of justice have evolved over the
years. In a complex, pluralistic society, it may
be unrealistic to expect general agreement
on the substance of justice in all respects.
However, we define justice in relation to in-
dividuals and discrete groups, and do not
easily, if at all, define justice in relation to the
complexities of the modern world or to future
generations. If there is an obligation for jus-
tice to the future it can be realized only in the
legacy passed on to the future. A significant
and fundamental part of that legacy is envi-
ronmental in both a material and conceptual
sense. The environment sets ultimate pa-
rameters within which options and opportu-
nities may or may not be realized.
Technology has the capability of utilizing
nature to reshape nature, but it would be
presumptuous to assume that technology
has no limits and thus may compensate for
whatever deprivations are inflicted upon the
environment.' s To destroy or impoverish
natural systems would, moreover, reduce
the resources available for technological in-
novation, including uses of technology to
protect the environment, Can it be seriously
argued that the possibility of technological
innovation justifies the intentional or inadver-
tent impairment of the quality of life and im-
poverishment of the biosphere?
There is evidence of a growing realiza-
tion throughout the world that human behav-
ior in relation to the environment may pro-
foundly affect the quality of life and human
welfare now and in the future. In at least fifty
nations environmental protection measures
have been written into constitutions-
although some are no more than pro forma
and relate to the national cultural patri-
mony.'6 Most of these countries fall into the
developing or Third World category where
several governments offer visible examples
of flagrant environmental mismanagement.
Nonetheless, these rhetorical commitments
have significance; they reveal, at least, that
recognition of environmental values may be
politically expedient. This recognition would
not be given if environmental values were
not in some sense regarded as important.
At least twenty of the United States have
environmental provisions In their state con-
stitutions.' 7 Some have statutory provisions
which, in certain respects (notably regarding
land use), provide more environmental
protection than does federal legislation (for
example, California, Florida, Vermont). But
the states presently cannot prevent pre-
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emptive action by the federal government
on certain environment-related issues; nu-
clear power and interstate shipments of haz-
ardous waste are among the more publicized
subjects of political contention. An environ-
mental provision in the Constitution would
not preempt the functions of the states on
matters of environmental protection and
could strengthen their position against inva-
sive action by federal agencies and by devel-
opers. State discretion would be reduced
only where state governments sought to
accommodate economic or other interests




In governments everywhere rhetoric is a
time-honored substitute for action. But
rhetoric is often a necessary precursor of ac-
tion. As the necessity of global cooperation
to protect the Earth's atmosphere, waters
and living systems becomes more apparent,
these rhetorical commitments may facilitate
international environmental policies and
agreements. Since the original Declaration
of Principles adopted by the 1972 United
Nations Conference on the Human Envi-
ronment at Stockholm, more than a dozen
significant multi-national declarations pertain-
ing to environmental quality have been is-
sued.' 8 Most are superficial or loosely
drawn. It is reasonable to believe that they
will have a positive effect upon the future of
international law.
It is difficult to believe that fully Informed
people could doubt that in an evermore in-
teractive, interdependent world, transna-
tional policies and institutions for protection
of the environment can indefinitely be re-
sisted. Many international policies have
been formally adopted, and more are being
proposed. Trends in the natural world, sci-
entifically identified and measured, are driv-
ing this process. But reductionist percep-
tions of environmental problems and the
persistence of archaic interpretations of
sovereignty have caused fractional and ad
hoc international responses to environmen-
tal imperatives. Comprehensive and inte-
grated statements of principles have been
promulgated by the United Nations Confer-
ence on the Human Environment, by the
World Charter for Nature and by the World
Commission on Environment and Develop-
ment. These pronouncements, more de-
tailed and explicit than the more numerous
declarations, have not yet had more than a
marginal impact upon governments, and
have not been generally accepted as bind-
ing international law. Yet they have added
precepts and propositions of an official char-
acter to theory on national behavior and In-
ternational obligation, and they represent
too much thought, negotiation and accep-
tance to have been merely extemporaneous
or ephemeral expressions.
A growing understanding of the transna-
tional character of environmental problems
has led to a convergence of national and In-
ternational environmental law.'9 Proposals
for an international convention for environ-
mental protection have been Introduced Into
the United States Senate. Of these, the
most notable is S Res 29, Introduced by Se-
nator Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island on Jan-
uary 24, 1977. This proposed treaty would
have required signatory governments to
prepare environmental assessments and to
consult with other countries In potentially
harmful projects. The treaty proposition was
still alive In April 1979 when the idea was pre-
sented to the Governing Council of the Unit-
ed Nations Environment Programme. 2° The
Idea was ahead of its time, and perhaps still
is. Yet in 1989, Amedeo Postiglione, a
distinguished Italian jurist, proposed at an In-
ternational congress In Rome the drafting of
a Universal Convention for the Environment
as a Human Right. The Convention, he de-
clared, "should specify an individual's
inalienable rights and establish an adequate
level of information, participation and actions
necessary to maintain those rights. The
Convention should also define the main
obligations of the Individual States [and] ...
must identify the people responsible for
promoting and protecting this human
right.' 21 Thus, the Convention would draw
upon both the natural rights and the posi-
tivist legal approaches to an international
constitutional law for the environment.
Meanwhile, consideration might be
given to a treaty with a more limited number
of signatories that would, in effect, establish
a quasi-constitutional basis for environmen-
tal law as provided under article VI of the
Constitution: "all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of
the Land...."
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Commenting on the feasibility of this ap-
proach Dolgin and Guilbert observe that:
The increasing.recognition that envi-
ronmental problems, however local
In origin, affect the world ecosystem
in ways that legitimately concern for-
eign governments should make
credible any attempt to deal mutually
with such problems through appro-
priate treaties and implementing
legislaton.22
This statement Is even more pertinent today,
eighteen years since it was written. Never-
theless, constitutional Interpretations in-
consistent with international obligations
could cripple their implementation under na-
tional law, a circumstance that an environ-
mental amendment could obviate. To ad-
dress this possibility, a committee of the
Economic Commission for Europe has pro-
posed a Charter on Environmental Rights
and Duties to be open for signature by ECE
members in 1992. A draft of the Charter,
published in the Bruntland Bulletin stresses
popular rights and specific governmental re-
sponsibilities. 23 '
Precedent for invoking the treaty power
on behalf of domestic policy was set by the
British-American treaty of 1916 for protec-
tion of migratory birds, extending federal
protection throughout the United States, to
those states that had no protective legisla-
tion, or that treated migratory wildlife as if it
belonged to any landowner on whose prop-
erty it might be found.24 Obviously a treaty
was necessary for protection of birds cross-
ing the international boundary between
Canada and the United States, but it was
also necessary to provide the Congress of
the United States with constitutional author-
ity to protect migratory wildlife through statu-
tory legislation. A treaty may supersede
conflicting statutory legislation at the time of
ratification, but unlike a constitutional
amendment, It does not prevent the
Congress from enacting contrary legislation
in the future. A constitutional amendment
would not only provide firmer assurance for
environmental protection in the United
States, .but would strengthen American
credibility abroad when, as seems probable,
new Initiatives and institutional arrangements
for global environmental protection are un-
dertaken.
THE CASE RESTATED
I return now to my principal thesis: (1)
environmental policy in the United States is
of sufficient importance to merit a declaration
of fundamental law; (2) the present status of
environmental law and public administration
requires a higher directive to remedy statu-
tory ambiguities and contradictions; and (3)
international cooperation on global environ-
mental issues could be strengthened
through an amendment to the United States
Constitution. Underlying the problem of
how to enhance the effectiveness of public
law in protection of the environment, at least
two major philosophical barriers need to be
lowered. The first is what some observers
see as a national obsession with individual
human rights, which gives a distinctive
American twist to the administration of
environmental law in the United States. The
second, which underlies the first, is the
belief in natural law as the source of human
rights, and the extension of the rights con-
cept to non-human life forms and even to
inanimate things.
It is not the function of this essay to de-
bate the natural law-human rights linkage.
Here, the purpose is to advance the propo-
sition that basic public law governing rela-
tionships between humans and their natural
environment is more firmly supportable by a
consensus on obligation and responsibility
than upon rights-whether metaphysically or
socially derived.
There is a logic, both ethical and juridical,
in basing law upon an affirmation of respon-
sibility rather than upon an assertion of
rights. Responsibilities and rights may be
linked, but responsibilities imply an obliga-
tion to act-a positive imperative-whereas
rights are characteristically asserted against
their infringement. A citizen may claim a
general "right" to have government protect
his or her environment, but this assertion
does not, in itself, establish an explicit obli-
gation on govemment to do anything. It may
be more difficult to demonstrate that a per-
son's environmental rights have been in-
fringed than to show that governments have
failed to perform specified duties when
those obligations are based upon funda-
mental law. The environmental impact
statement mandated by NEPA is a duty
specified by law and so enforceable in fed-
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eral courts. But public officials may evade
and equivocate the non-procedural sub-
stantive mandates of NEPA, since there is
no justiciable way to enforce these stated
obligations in agency planning and decision
making.
Obligations and responsibilities, like
rights, are derived from societal consensus.
In one respect, however, the concept of re-
sponsibilities has a more empirical, demon-
strable and tangible foundation. This is
ascertainable where the consequences of
prior action or inaction are experienced, or
can be described and measured. Complexi-
ties in the real world, coupled with the lag be-
tween events and outcomes, make cause-
effect analysis difficult and sometimes be-
yond our ability to ascertain. Even so, as
science and analytic technologies grow and
advance, fixation of causal factors, even
when complex, becomes more reliable. Sys-
tems analysis and computing capabilities are
enlarging areas only recently accessible.
Responsibility in a cause-effect sense ap-
pears to be less difficult to ascertain than
before, whereas claims of individual rights
appeal to beliefs and to values that lack visi-
ble consequences in the natural world. For
example, one can ascertain, measure and, to
a certain degree, objectively evaluate the
consequences of ill-conceived irrigation
projects or of clear-cutting of forests. But
when measuring or evaluating individual
claims of environmental wrongs, one could
be more susceptible to subjective bias. The
adjudication of health and injury claims offer
many cases in point. Invariably the question
arises: did the claimant's behavior contribute
to the alleged damage? In actual circum-
stances, if not always in a legal sense, peo-
ple cannot divorce themselves from what-
ever share of responsibility inheres in their
conduct.
Although the Declaration of Principles
adopted by the 1972 United Nations Con-
ference at Stockholm asserted the funda-
mental human right to "an environment of a
quality that permits a life of dignity and well-
being," it also asserted "a solemn responsi-
bility to protect and improve the environment
for present and future generations." The
emphasis of the declared twenty-six princi-
ples was clearly on responsibilities rather
than rights. The shorter Declaration on the
Human Environment was foremost a state-
ment of duties and responsibilities. After
setting forth the imperative to defend and
improve the human environment, paragraph
seven declared that:
To achieve this environmental
goal will demand the acceptance of
responsibility by citizens and com-
munities and by enterprises and In-
stitutions at every level, all sharing
equitably in common efforts. Indi-
viduals in all walks of life as well as
organizations in many fields, by their
values and the sum of their actions,
will shape the world environment of
the future. Local and national gov-
ernments will bear the greatest bur-
den for large-scale environmental
policy and action within their jurisdic-
tions. International co-operation Is
also needed In order to raise re-
sources to support the developing
countries in carrying out their re-
sponsibilities in this field. A growing
class of environmental problems,
because they are regional or global
in extent or because they affect the
common international realm, will re-
quire extensive co-operation among
nations and action by International
organizations in the common inter-
est. The Conference calls upon
Governments and peoples to exert
common efforts for the preservation
and improvement of the human en-
vironment, for the benefit of all the
people and for their posterity. 2s
In efforts to actualize these principles
the great powers have failed to provide con-
sistent leadership. Among these, the Unit-
ed States has pursued an ambivalent and
paradoxical course. No one can wholly
escape from the disasters that threaten the
world's environment. The United States has
taken the lead In many aspects of environ-
mental protection, but it has not given this
protection a place In its fundamental law. It Is
still possible, as under the Reagan presi-
dency, for the federal government to re-
verse commitments and, where there Is no
clear, substantive constitutional mandate, to
ignore the constitutional obligation of the
President to ensure that the laws be.falth-
fully executed.28 Except In cases of clearly
evident dereliction, the President Is the sole




If the United States is to lead in world
environmental affairs, or even to join in
common efforts, It will be necessary to arrive
at a general consensus upon basic priorities.
If the United States is unable or unwilling to
place environmental protection high among
Its constitutional obligations, it will hardly be a
credible leader among nations in this aspect
of public and International policy. More is
expected of the United States than of most
nations. Amending the United States Con-
stitution to recognize the fundamental im-
portance of the environment in national and
world affairs would set an example that could
greatly facilitate the movement toward global
environmental protection, which must suc-
ceed if we are to preserve the richness and
renewability of the living Earth.
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